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468 THOMAS GEHRING 
INTERNATIONAL environmental law develops predominantly through the establish-
ment and evolution of highly dynamic environmental treaty systems. Such treaty sys-
tems are issue-specific institutional structures that are purposively established, and 
maintained, by their member states to govern specific areas of international envir-
onmental relations. Typically, they address collective action problems with a strong 
transnational, in some cases even a global, dimension. Problems of this kind can-
not be addressed successfully at the domestic level, either because they have a trans-
boundary component or because relevant countries are exploiting a common pool 
resource such as migratory fish, or polluting or destroying a common environmental 
good such as the ozone layer or a regional sea. 
Environmental treaty systems are designed to facilitate and speed up the dynamic 
development of substantive regulations. Frequently, obligations are tightened with 
growing scientific and technological knowledge about a given problem and the grad-
ual emergence of suitable abatement strategies. Dynamic treaty systems constitute 
hybrid structures somewhere between traditional international treaties that set forth 
substantive rules or standards to regulate a given area of common interest, and inter-
national organizations established for ongoing communication and decision-
making purposes. In addition to substantive obligations, they include institutional 
components of varying design, which are, compared to multilateral agreements in 
other policy fields, remarkably strong. Typically, they contain arrangements for the 
adoption of new obligations, for decision-making on implementation issues, for 
internalizing scientific and technological information, for the review of implemen-
tation, and for the processing of cases of (alleged) non-compliance (see Chapter 38 
'Treaty Bodies'). 
Important environmental treaty systems include: 
• the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention); 
• the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter (London Convention); 
• the 1972 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora 
and Fauna (CITES); 
• the 1976 Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
(Barcelona Convention) and its several protocols; 
• the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP 
Convention) and its eight protocols to date; 
• the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention) 
and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete Ozone Layer (Montreal 
Protocol); 
• the 1989 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Wastes (Basel Convention) and the 1999 Protocol on Liability and Compensation; 
• the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and the 1998 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC (Kyoto Protocol); 
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• the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 2000 Cartagena Proto-
col on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol); and 
• the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and Lakes. 
This chapter examines how the establishment and operation of treaty systems such 
as these helps to create and develop international environmental law. Section 1 inquires 
into the emergence of environmental treaty systems and identifies two characteristics 
of the evolving law-making structure: first, the 'constitutionalization' of treaty 
systems through the creation of new structures for the making of international envir-
onmental law, and, second, the institutional fragmentation of international environ-
mental governance. Section 2 examines the policy-making dimension of environmental 
treaty systems and identifies three areas of intra-institutional activity relevant to the 
law-making process: broadening and tightening commitments over time; elaborat-
ing upon, and in some cases redefining, existing obligations through an administra-
tive process; and undertaking scientific and technical assessments to reinforce and 
accelerate normative development. Section 3 explores the output of the law-making 
process, arguing that different types of law emerge. Whereas regular treaty law is still 
the most important single output of environmental law-making, it is supplemented 
by law emerging from simplified amendment procedures and secondary decisions of 
competent treaty bodies. 
1 N O R M A T I V E D E V E L O P M E N T THROUGH 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF N E W 
E N V I R O N M E N T A L TREATY SYSTEMS 
i-i Formation of Environmental Treaty Systems 
Deliberate international governance requires arrangements for collective decision-
making. Tacitly emerging social norms, whether legally binding or not, can merely 
reflect, and subsequently stabilize, the existing behaviour of their addressees 
(see Chapter 19 'Formation of Customary International Law and General Principles'). 
If social norms are to be used to change an undesirable status quo, they must be 
molded prior to the action that they are intended to guide.' States intending to estab-
lish governance for an area of international relations must organize themselves, and 
acquire the ability to decide collectively upon social norms that indicate desired 
On the difference between spontaneous and negotiated regimes, see O.R. Young, 'Regime 
Dynamics. The Rise and Fall of International Regimes' (1982) 36 Int'l Org. 277 at 282-3. 
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behaviour. To understand how international environmental treaty law is made and 
developed, it is important to note that every deliberately designed international rule 
is inevitably related to some organizational component. It can emerge from a simple 
diplomatic conference or from some more complex organizational structure gov-
erning an area of international relations (see Chapter 32'International Institutions'). 
Environmental treaty systems originate from inter-governmental negotiations. 
The traditional organizational arrangement for deliberate international governance 
is the temporarily established diplomatic conference. A diplomatic conference is 
convened when a group of actors so desires, and dissolved upon the adoption of 
the final act of the conference to which the treaty is attached. Alternatively, a 
treaty may be prepared within an existing international organization and adopted 
by a separately convened diplomatic conference or by a negotiating committee. 
Occasionally, a treaty is not only elaborated within, but also adopted by a decision of, 
an international organization. In all cases, the treaty is subsequently opened for sig-
nature by states and enters into force upon ratification by the number of states 
required by the treaty. 
Decision-making in treaty-making negotiations on environmental issues, in 
practice, relies predominantly on the consensus principle. While frequently not even 
formally defined, consensus may be conceived of as the 'absence of any objection by 
a representative and submitted by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of 
the decision in question.'2 Conceptually, it is located somewhere between unanimity 
and majority voting. Like the former, it preserves the right of all parties to reject an 
undesired decision, but, like the latter, it does not require a positive vote by all parties. 
Whereas decisive actors can pursue their interests, indifference is treated as agree-
ment. Hence, consensus decision-making requires active intervention in the nego-
tiation process before the final decision is adopted.3 What is more, decisions are not 
made by casting votes, but are developed through the gradual removal of objections 
against particular aspects of a draft treaty (often indicated by the bracketing of text). 
Settlements that are achieved are difficult to challenge later in the process because 
indifferent actors will tend to have accommodated themselves with the result so that 
support grows. 
Before a negotiation process can start, pre-decisions have to be made about the 
relevant group of participating actors and the range of issues to be discussed. The 
problems of international relations are not simply 'given', but are, at least to some 
degree, 'socially constructed'. Accordingly, the subject of the negotiations and the 
emerging issue-area of the future environmental treaty system can, to some degree, 
be deliberately designed. Usually, the process will start with concern by interested 
2
 Quoted from J. Sizoo and R.T. Jurjens, CSCE-Decision-Making: The Madrid Experience (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) at 57. 
3
 On the implications of consensus decision-making, see B. Buzan, 'Negotiating by Consensus: 
Developments in Technique at the United Nations Conference at the Law of the Sea (1981) 75 A.J.I.L. 324 
at .U4-47-
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actors about some undesirable development, which they believe can be remedied by 
international cooperation. For example, during the 1980s an epistemic community of 
atmospheric scientists succeeded in bringing the problem of global climate change 
onto the international agenda (see Chapter 14 'Atmosphere and Outer Space'). In 
defining the problem as a subject of international negotiations, numerous questions 
then had to be addressed. Should the climate regime address adaptation as well as 
mitigation? Should it aim at binding national targets and timetables to reduce green-
house gas emissions or at the development of specific policies and measures? Should 
it focus on all greenhouse gases or just carbon dioxide? Should it treat climate 
change as a task mainly for cooperation among industrialized countries or as a mat-
ter of global concern? Should it be considered as just another aspect of the overall 
problem of protecting the global atmosphere or as a separate subject of international 
relations? 
The delimitation of issues and actors has an immediate effect on the constellation 
of interests upon which substantive compromise will eventually be founded.4 
Negotiation theory demonstrates that adding or subtracting issues and parties 
changes opportunities for actors to pursue their interests. Since no round of inter-
national negotiations, however broadly designed, can tackle all problems between all 
states, numerous pending issues are excluded from a negotiation. Actors may favour 
different delimitations of the emerging issue-area because they cannot successfully 
pursue interests related to excluded issues. They can expect concessions only from 
those actors participating in the negotiation round. Generally, an issue area must be 
sufficiently broad to allow for cooperation gains of all relevant parties, but it does not 
have to include all substantively related issues. Likewise, the group of participating 
actors must be sufficiently large to allow meaningful cooperation and will usually have 
to include the major players in the field, but it does not have to be all-inclusive. Even 
global problems might be successfully tackled, at least temporarily, by a comparatively 
small group of actors. Despite the global nature of the problem, the Montreal Protocol 
was adopted at a conference attended by 58 states and the European Community, 
and it was immediately signed by only 25 states and the European Community— 
including, however, most major polluters. 
The initiation of a new environmental treaty system within the framework of an 
existing international organization, rather than through a separately established 
diplomatic conference, can considerably lower the organizational costs of an inter-
governmental negotiation process. These costs increase dramatically with the num-
ber of states involved. They include the preparation of documents in, and the 
translation of discussions into, usually several conference languages as well as the 
procedural organization of the conference process. Existing organizations provide 
room for the occasionally lengthy pre-negotiation of the precise terms of references 
4
 J-K. Sebenius,'Designing Negotiations toward a New Regime: The Case of Global Warming' (1991) 
l n t l
 Security 110 at 110-48. 
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of the newly established negotiation process, and will thus legitimize an initiative if a 
mandate is agreed upon according to established procedures. In the absence of a suit-
able organizational framework, one or more interested states not only have to take 
the political initiative, they must also be prepared to organize and invite an intergov-
ernmental conference and provide servicing functions. 
The clearly defined memberships of established international organizations, and 
their specific agendas and organizational cultures, open opportunities for forum 
shopping and may lead to lengthy struggles over the choice of the appropriate forum. 
The most pertinent example of forum shopping is the decade-long struggle of the 
Nordic countries to put the issue of long-range transboundary air pollution on the 
international agenda. Originating in the 1960s as a bilateral issue between these coun-
tries and the United Kingdom, transboundary air pollution was introduced first into 
the Council of Europe, then into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and finally into the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe and the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Only the 
latter pan-European context, with its close linkage to the highly political issues of 
East-West relations as well as the involvement of the United States and Canada, pro-
vided the foundation for the adoption of the LRTAP Convention in 1979. In other 
cases, countries with diverging interests struggle over the appropriate forum. Hence, 
negotiations on the UNFCCC were launched by the UN General Assembly rather 
than by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) because developing countries 
advocated a close link between the issues of environmental protection and economic 
development. And the regulation of trade restrictions for genetically modified 
organisms was disputed between the World Trade Organization (WTO), with its 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and the CBD with its Cartagena 
Protocol.3 
Most global and larger regional environmental treaty systems have been estab-
lished within the framework of an existing international organization or similar 
international structure. Most important has been UNEP, which is not a formally 
independent international organization, but a programme under the auspices of the 
UN General Assembly. UNEP has been the catalyst for such important environmen-
tal treaty systems as the Vienna Convention and its Montreal Protocol, the Basel 
Convention, the CBD, and several regional seas conventions protecting, inter alia, the 
Mediterranean and the Red Sea. As already mentioned, the UNFCCC negotiations 
were initiated by the UN General Assembly. Two important global conventions of the 
early 1970s, namely CITES and the London Convention, were negotiated as part of 
the broader process associated with the 1972 United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, which was organized by the United Nations and also led to the 
Oberthiir and T. Gehring,'Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: 
of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization' (2006) 6 Global Envt'l 
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creation of UNEP. Other treaty systems originated from more specialized organiza-
tions. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) provided the institutional 
framework for several conventions on marine pollution from ships, including 
accidental oil spills. And the UNECE assisted in the establishment of the 1979 LRTAP 
Convention and the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and Lakes. Only a few modern environmental treaty systems were 
established without the assistance of an existing institutional structure. This has been 
the case especially for sub-regional cooperative projects with a limited membership, 
for which no appropriate multi-purpose organization exists, such as the Convention 
for the Protection of the River Rhine, the Convention for the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention), the Convention 
forthe Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources (Paris Convention), 
and the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area (Baltic Sea Convention). 
1.2 Two Characteristics of International Environmental 
Law-Making: Constutionalization of Environmental 
Treaty Systems and Institutional Fragmentation 
i-2.i Constitutionalization 
An important characteristic of international environmental governance is the grad-
ual constitutionalization of environmental treaty systems. Almost all modern envir-
onmental treaty systems create their own institutional apparatuses (see Chapter 38 
'Treaty Bodies'). A few treaty systems, such as the Baltic Sea Convention and the 
Oslo and Paris Conventions, establish fully independent small-scale international 
organizations, while some others draw entirely upon the decision-making bodies 
and secretariat of their parent organization (for example, the marine conventions 
administered by the IMO). Most environmental treaty systems lie somewhere in 
between, retaining a relationship to their parent organization but having their own 
identity as well. Typically, a conference of the parties in which all member states are 
represented constitutes the supreme decision-making body. Many environmental 
treaty systems establish a secretariat that is financed by the member states and 
supervised by the conference of the parties, while being hosted by the parent 
organization. This arrangement can be attributed to the fact that many of the 
'mportant treaty systems of the 1970s and 1980s emerged either from loose institu-
tional settings such as the UN Conference on the Human Environment or from 
UNEP with its restricted budget. Thus, the Ramsar Convention and CITES were 
facilitated until the mid-1970s by UNEP, but members were then asked to provide 
their own funding. Later treaty systems such as the Vienna Convention and its 
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Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, as well as several regional seas con-
ventions, from the beginning provided for their own administrative budgets and 
secretariat functions, while being attached to UNEP to avoid the creation of numer-
ous fully independent mini-organizations. 
The establishment of a permanent decision-making apparatus as a part of a mod-
ern environmental treaty system has been a consequence of negative experience with 
the more static arrangements of some early multilateral environmental agreements, 
especially in the area of the protection of nature and wildlife. It is widely seen as 
a major drawback that 'sleeping treaties',6 such as the 1940 Convention on Nature 
Protection and Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, and the 1968 African 
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, did not create 
their own institutional components, including appropriate arrangements for flex-
ible amendment and administration. A decision-making arrangement with a mere 
temporary existence such as a diplomatic conference or a preparatory committee is 
generally not particularly well-suited for international environmental governance 
because substantive treaty law must then be designed so as to regulate a subject 
matter so comprehensively that further decisions are dispensable. In institutional 
economics, such an arrangement is called a 'complete contract'—in contrast to an 
'incomplete contract' that deliberately leaves certain matters to subsequent decision-
making.7 Although it does not exclude amendments negotiated at further diplomatic 
conferences or within newly established preparatory committees (see section 3.1), the 
flexibility of a treaty system is thereby sharply limited. 
Institutional flexibility is needed because transnational environmental problems 
develop dynamically, and constitute a highly unstable subject matter for regulation. 
They are created, and solved, by human economic activity, which depends on such 
factors as economic growth, technological development and changing preferences. 
Early attempts to regulate an environmental problem are frequently initiated under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty. Even highly complex substantive rules cannot be 
designed to account for all possible future developments within the regulated issue 
area. Moreover, in the absence of a permanent institutional apparatus, international 
treaties do not provide for arrangements for collective implementation review 
and conflict management. Since successful environmental governance frequently 
requires costly investments by states and their subjects, it regularly creates incentives 
for free riding and may even over-stretch the capacities of member states for action.8 
As a consequence of their organizational arrangements, modern environmental 
treaty systems become themselves machineries for the making and development 
ot international environmental law. Despite the frequent retention of links to an 
<• S. Lyster, International Wildlife Law: An Analysis of International Treaties Concerned with the 
Conservation oj Wildlife (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1985) at 124. 
s A** °\^' W l " i a m s o n ' The Eco"">nic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1987) at '78-
A. Chayes and A. Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) 
TREATY-MAKING AND EVOLUTION 475 
existing international organization, many treaty systems have become virtual organ-
izations for the management of substantive international treaties. Even if a treaty 
system draws upon an existing organization, this organization derives its decision-
making competence from the respective treaty system. Once established, the member 
states may introduce specialized decision procedures that may deviate considerably 
from the original negotiation situation and involve scientists, experts, and non-
governmental organizations. By delegating certain powers to the new entity, member 
states 'constitutionalize' governance within a given area of international relations. 
1.2.2 Fragmentation 
The second characteristic of international environmental governance is its institu-
tional fragmentation. International environmental law encompasses more than 200 
separately established environmental treaty systems. In contrast, the institutional 
landscape is much less fragmented in other problem areas such as international 
trade. The absence of a single international environmental organization may be 
attributed to the fact that most large-scale international organizations were estab-
lished around the end of the Second World War, whereas international environmen-
tal affairs as a specific area of international governance developed mainly after 1970. 
Although the lack of an overarching institution is frequently deplored and has led 
to demands for the establishment of a World Environment Organization, institu-
tional fragmentation arguably reflects a strength, rather than a weakness, of inter-
national environmental governance. There may simply be no real need for a single 
comprehensive organization because many environmental problems are best tackled 
separately from others. It is difficult to see how lumping together several separately 
institutionalized treaty systems could significantly increase the opportunities for 
cooperation. Interests in such large issue-areas as international trade or law of the sea 
are often asymmetrically distributed, so that actors seek advantages on one issue 
while giving concessions on another. In contrast, interests regarding major environ-
mental problems are frequently symmetrically distributed so that all actors must 
adopt similar measures (reduce pollution) to enjoy similar benefits from the preser-
vation of a global or regional common (for example, the protection of the global cli-
mate, the ozone layer, or a regional sea). Linking such issues would primarily enhance 
the complexity of negotiations rather than create new opportunities for cooperation. 
Under these circumstances, the absence of a single international environmental 
organization allows states to design institutional arrangements tailor-made to the 
specific needs of a particular cooperation project. 
The far-reaching institutional fragmentation of international environmental 
governance leads to increasing interaction between different treaty systems. 
Institutional interaction occurs in very different forms.9 It may create synergy 
9
 S. Oberthür and T. Gehring, eds., Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: 
ynrgy and Conflict among International and EU Policies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). 
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between the institutions involved or disrupt the governance effort. On the one hand, 
the normative development within one institution can influence the normative 
development within another system. This will be true if a regional treaty system (for 
instance, the Oslo Convention) influences normative development in a similarly 
focused global system (for example, the London Convention); or if institutional 
innovations invented within one treaty system, such as non-compliance procedures 
or simplified amendment procedures, are adopted by others; or if states establish a sep-
arate institution (for example, the International North Sea Ministerial Conferences) in 
order to influence an existing treaty system (for instance, the Oslo Convention). On 
the other hand, one treaty system can influence the behaviour of states and non-state 
actors relevant to the implementation of another treaty system. This would be the 
case to the degree that incentives created under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol 
to plant fast-growing trees as sinks of carbon dioxide discourage the preservation and 
expansion of species-rich traditional forests and thereby hamper the implementa-
tion of the CBD.io 
2 P O L I C Y - M A K I N G D I M E N S I O N OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY SYSTEMS 
Many environmental treaty systems rely on an explicit step-by-step approach that 
does not aim at the comprehensive solution of a larger problem at once, but at the 
rapid conclusion of a set of initial instruments and the establishment of a policy-
making process directed at preparing further instruments. The regulatory approach 
of environmental treaty systems differs significantly from that pursued in other 
policy fields. Instruments tend to codify realistic targets, accompanied by the expect-
ation of sincere implementation and the opportunity to tighten obligations, if pos-
sible. With a view towards possible revision, they include provisions for the regular 
review of substantive obligations and for possible decisions on additional measures 
in light of new scientific, economic, and technological information. This approach 
contrasts starkly with human rights conventions, which tend to codify comprehen-
sive catalogues of obligations and create enormous implementation deficits. And 
negotiations of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea illustrated that an overall 
approach linking numerous separate issues to a package of overwhelming size and 
complexity might lead to cumbersome and time-consuming negotiations, with a 
significant risk of failure. 
10
 See C.P. Pontecorvo, 'Interdependence between Global Environmental Regimes: The Kyoto 
Protocol on Climate Change and Forest Protection (1999) 59 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches 
Recht und Völkerrecht 709 at 709-49. 
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The permanent law-making process not only blurs the distinction between the 
making and the implementation of law because later and more specific rules and 
decisions refine and reinterpret earlier and more general rules. It also opens the 
opportunity for feedback processes, through which a treaty system can adjust pol-
icy measures to the effects of its own governance activities, so as to increase its own 
effectiveness.11 
2.1 Development of International Environmental 
Law through Political Decision-Making within 
Treaty Systems 
The substantive obligations of almost all important treaty systems have significantly 
changed over time. The Montreal Protocol, which was adopted in 1987, has been 
amended in 1990,1992,1997, and 1999 in order to gradually tighten the reduction 
schedules for ozone-depleting substances, to extend its regulatory measures to new 
substances, and to introduce new supporting measures, most important of which is 
the introduction of a multi-million dollar multilateral fund for the financial support 
of developing countries. Likewise, the LRTAP Convention has adopted a whole series 
or protocols that have gradually expanded the scope of the regime from the control of 
a single pollutant, namely sulphur dioxide, to virtually all important air pollutants. 
The regulatory approach of the Basel Convention has been transformed from a 
.'censing system for the international trade of hazardous wastes based upon prior 
informed consent into an almost total ban of exports from OECD countries to non-
u
 countries. Regulation under the London Convention has been expanded to 
cover sources of marine pollution such as the incineration of wastes at sea and to 
Phase out the dumping of industrial and radioactive wastes. And CITES regularly 
PP ies its trade-restricting measures to newly endangered species of flora and fauna 
nas also developed new regulatory approaches, such as quota systems, which are 
not envisaged within the treaty itself.12 
"ginally, flexibility was achieved through the split between the general obliga-
n s
 in the main body of a treaty and more specific rules set forth in an allegedly 
nical annex, which was frequently subject to a simplified amendment procedure. 
h e
 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Whaling Con-
e n
 ion) was one of the first treaties to take this approach, setting forth detailed regu-
10ns in a schedule that can be amended by qualified majority vote. Similarly, 
a and the London Convention set forth their core obligations in their main 
' ' Sep T f~" u • 
i- Behring, Dynamic International Reeimes: Institutions for International Environmental 
/TeTp HFr,ankfUrt: PCter Un* ^  at «** 
Gr«. <-i 1 ' C o m m o d i t y or Taboo? The Regulation of Trade in Endangered Species' (1997) 6 
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body, while their annexes specify protected species of flora and fauna and regulated 
types of ocean dumping respectively. The International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention), which was adopted in 
1973/78, elaborated this model by including both mandatory and voluntary annexes. 
More recently, the adoption of protocols subsidiary to existing conventions 
has become the most important method for the development of treaty law. The 
convention-protocol approach has been specifically developed to support the step-
by-step approach of environmental governance. The Barcelona Convention—the 
first and most important project within UNEP's regional seas programme—was 
deliberately designed as an umbrella treaty, whose ratification was conditional upon 
the simultaneous acceptance of two substantive protocols, while other protocols are 
voluntary. So far, five protocols have entered into force and two more have been 
adopted. Under the 1979 LRTAP Convention, eight protocols have entered into 
force. These two treaty systems have developed the greatest virtuosity in employing 
the convention—protocol arrangement to deepen and broaden their respective regu-
latory approaches. The ability to agree on new sets of obligations has regularly led 
to the adoption of new instruments. Likewise, the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto 
Protocol, and the Cartagena Protocol have supplemented the Vienna Convention, 
the UNFCCC, and the CBD respectively. 
The convention-protocol approach increasingly reverses the original relationship 
between the substantive and the institutional components of a treaty system. In earl-
ier treaties, such as the previously mentioned London Convention and CITES, the 
procedural machinery and auxiliary rules concerning negotiation, information, and 
reporting were included in conventions subsequent to agreement on substantive 
obligations in order to ensure that the obligations were implemented and developed. 
More recently, the adoption of framework conventions in the absence of substantive 
obligations has become a vehicle for the development of substantive obligations and 
their acceptance. Whereas ratification of the Barcelona Convention was still condi-
tional upon the simultaneous acceptance of two substantive protocols, the adoption 
of the LRTAP Convention reflected continued disagreement among the member 
states about meaningful commitments to reduce the emission of key air pollutants. 
The parties merely agreed to establish a separate process and the necessary institu-
tional machinery for the making of international environmental law regulating long-
range transboundary air pollution as well as duties to cooperate, to report, and to 
provide information. Likewise, the Vienna Convention merely established the insti-
tutional machinery of the treaty system and some auxiliary obligations, because the 
participating states, in 1985, could not agree on hard obligations to reduce emissions 
of ozone-depleting substances. During negotiation of the UNFCCC in 1992. a i s" 
agreement once again prevented the adoption of a clause that would have committed 
the parties to stabilizing their carbon dioxide emissions, so that this instrument also 
lacks hard substantive obligations. 
By concluding a framework convention as a first step of an evolutionary regulatory 
process, states deliberately modify the subsequent negotiation situation in a number 
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of ways. On the one hand, bargaining will be more institutionalized than before. The 
convention establishes the negotiation situation for the subsequent deliberations on 
substantive obligations. It defines the problem to be addressed in general terms, and 
it delimits the group of actors that are entitled to participate in the ensuing negoti-
ations. Since the convention establishes the basic principles, institutions, and deci-
sion-making mechanisms, later protocols might be very concise, depending on the 
complexity of their regulatory approach. On the other hand, agreement on, and 
entry into force of, a framework convention generates permanent pressure on reluc-
tant member states to reconsider their positions. Hence, the UNFCCC requires gov-
ernments to develop greenhouse gas inventories, to formulate national strategies and 
measures, and to cooperate in scientific research on the problem. Due to the ongoing 
policy process, governments are continuously confronted with demands by other 
states and, increasingly, by domestic stakeholders to cooperate, and they are routinely 
forced to face new, or collectively evaluated, scientific insights. Such pressure appears 
to be more easily organized within a well-established institutional structure than, say, 
in the framework of a multi-purpose international organization or a separately gath-
ered diplomatic conference.13 
Since framework conventions, being full-fledged international treaties, require 
time-consuming domestic ratification, member states tend to start the permanent 
process of negotiating new environmental law even before the convention has for-
mally entered into force. Such 'interim mechanisms' emphasize the importance of 
the process component, focusing on the development of future law, as compared to 
the mere implementation of the substance already agreed upon. 
2.2 Development of International Environmental Law 
through Administrative Decision-Making within 
Treaty Systems 
The development of international environmental law is also driven by permanent 
decision-making activities beyond the occasional adoption or regular amendment of 
treaties. Although these activities are usually considered as management or imple-
mentation of treaty provisions, they have important implications for the devel-
opment of international environmental law and its effectiveness. Moreover, since 
s u c
" administrative' decision-making may be governed by more complex decision-
making procedures, it can affect the process of law-making and, arguably, also the 
n r . . . 
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content of the resulting decisions. Virtually all modern environmental treaty systems 
provide the institutional framework for the adoption of administrative decisions 
of various kinds for the filling of gaps in the treaty law or for its formal or infor-
mal adjustment to changed circumstances (see Chapter 4 'Global Environmental 
Governance as Administration'). 
Regular administrative decision-making permanently renews normative expect-
ations and bridges unexpected gaps of treaty law so as to avoid doubt about common 
obligations and preclude their unilateral interpretation. Such decisions reassure the 
members of the treaty system of the normative expectations held by the entire com-
munity of member states about their behaviour. They shape and re-shape normative 
agreement and reestablish the commitment entered into previously. For example, at 
the request of the Soviet Union, the Montreal Protocol had permitted, under certain 
circumstances, an increase in the production of ozone-depleting substances beyond 
1986 levels. The Meeting of the Parties (MOP) 'decided' by consensus that such a 
production increase may not be used for export to non-parties of the protocol.14 
Similarly, the executive body of the LRTAP Convention bridged a gap in the first sul-
phur dioxide protocol by way of interpretation. While parties were committed to 
reduce their sulphur dioxide emissions by at least 30 per cent by 1993, the protocol did 
not address the period after 1993. Therefore, the executive body 'noted a common 
understanding among the Parties'15 that an increase in such emissions after 1993 
would be inconsistent with the protocol. 
Administrative decision-making is also employed to relieve treaty-making nego-
tiations from numerous tasks that could in principle also have been dealt with at the 
outset. It constitutes a means to accelerate the conclusion of a negotiation and 
to postpone the settlement of pending conflicts. The Montreal Protocol (Article 8) 
and its London Amendment (Article 10.1) assigned the task of adopting a non-
compliance procedure and an indicative list of incremental costs to be financed by 
the financial mechanism to the MOP of the Montreal Protocol.16 The Kyoto Protocol 
explicitly assigns a whole range of tasks to the MOP, including the elaboration 
of rules regarding emissions trading, the clean development mechanism, and the 
crediting of sink activities. These decisions were provisionally adopted in 2001 by the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) of the convention in the form the 'Marrakesh 
Accords' and were formally adopted by the first MOP of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. 
Likewise, administrative decision-making is occasionally employed to rapidly 
develop an environmental treaty system though the adoption of decisions that are 
not expressly provided for in the respective treaties. The MOP of the Montreal 
Protocol established in 1990 an interim multilateral fund by a simple 'decision' 
14
 Decision I.12G, Report of the Parties to the Montreal Protoeol on the Work of Their First Meeting, Doc 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5 (6 May 1989). 
15
 See Report of the Seventh Session of the Executive Body, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/20 (1989) a< P a r a ' 2 2 ' 
16
 Adopted by Decisions IV/18 and IV/5, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15 (25 November 1992)-
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without a specific competence. The decision, adopted by consensus, was part of a 
broader agreement that paved the way for the accession of important developing 
countries.17 Without a specific competence, the COP of CITES has, over time, 
adopted various law-making decisions, which are apparently intended to, and seem 
to be regarded as, formally committing the member states. The regulatory approach 
of the Basel Convention was first thoroughly changed by a decision of the COP of the 
Basel Convention that replaced the original system of prior informed consent by a 
ban of exports of hazardous wastes from OECD countries to non-OECD countries.18 
Finally, administrative decision-making may create soft law instruments, if the 
adoption of hard law proves to be impossible. When support by the member states 
increases, their content may be transferred into hard law later on. Especially under 
the London Convention, legally binding obligations have repeatedly been preceded 
by recommendations. Hence, a recommendation of 1983 to prohibit the dumping of 
radioactive waste only became formal treaty law in 1993. Likewise, the amendments 
to the convention to phase out the incineration of wastes at sea and the disposal of 
industrial wastes at sea had been prepared by soft law instruments. Under the 
Montreal Protocol, the comparatively weak original control measures were first 
tightened by the Helsinki Resolution of 1989, before the new obligations became part 
of the first amendment adopted in 1990. 
The increasing relevance of such administrative decision-making has changed 
the nature of environmental treaty systems and the process of environmental law-
making. There is an implicit trade-off between the complexity of substantive regu-
lation in the original treaty and the relevance of secondary law-making. The more 
detailed the substantive regulations of the treaty are, the less room exists for subse-
quent decision-making that might generate momentum of its own and the more 
traditional the legal development of the treaty system will be—and vice versa. The 
less elaborate the substantive treaty rules are and the more actors resort to postpon-
ing decisions to later stages of the governance process, the more important the insti-
tutional component of the arrangement will be from which such later decisions 
emerge and the more flexibly will the environmental law governing the issue area in 
question develop. Hence, the two levels of law-making become—to some degree— 
unctional equivalents—that is, actors can increasingly choose the level at which they 
will deal with a given problem. 
, °
r d e r t o e s t a r , l
' '
s n
 the fund on a permanent basis, however, the parties did not rely merely on a 
decision, but rather did so by means of the London Amendment, which has in the meantime 
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Administrative decision-making does not necessarily have to involve all parties to 
a treaty system. It may also rely upon true delegation of decision-making competen-
cies to committees or more complex decision-making arrangements. Decisions to 
classify endangered species of flora and fauna under CITES are guided by extensive 
criteria, and pass through a multi-tier procedure that assigns an important role to the 
Secretariat. The member states of the Montreal Protocol went a step further, and 
assigned decisions on funding to an Executive Board comprised of a limited number 
of developing and developed countries. Funds are allocated according to an indicative 
list of incremental costs, so that decisions are based on comparatively well-defined 
criteria.19 Probably the most impressive administrative apparatus is currently estab-
lished under the Kyoto Protocol for the approval, management, and control of pro-
jects under the clean development mechanism, which allows developed countries to 
obtain certified emission reduction credits from projects located within developing 
countries. This system of administrative decision-making is accountable to the MOP 
and operates under its general supervision and guidance.20 However, it is designed 
so as to preclude immediate intervention of the political body into case-specific 
decision-making. 
Arrangements involving true delegation are usually designed to remove certain 
decisions from intergovernmental bargaining and to ensure rule-based decision-
making. They are well known from (semi-) independent regulatory agencies within 
the European Union and domestic political systems. Acceptance of resulting deci-
sions does not rely on the consent of all parties to their precise content, but rather on 
the legitimacy of the procedural arrangement and the expectation that decisions can 
be justified by convincing arguments (see Chapter 30 'Legitimacy'). In essence, these 
procedures are designed to transform power-based bargaining into reason-based 
arguing. They rely on a division of two decision-making functions. First, general 
decision criteria and procedures for case-specific decision-making are elaborated. 
At this stage, stake-holders are at least partially hindered from acting according 
to their case-specific interests because any rules and procedures that they elaborate 
will apply to numerous different and possibly still unknown cases—thus creating a 
partial Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance'.21 Under these conditions actors will tend to pro-
mote well-operating procedures and fair-—that is, non-discriminating—substantive 
19
 F. Biermann,'Financing Environmental Politics in the South: Experiences from the Multilateral 
Ozone Fund' (1997) 9 Int'l Envt'l Affairs 179. 
2U
 See Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism, as defined in Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Decision 17/CP. 7, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Marrakesh, 
29 October-10 November 2001: Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume 
II., Doc. FCCC/CP/2ooi/i3/Add.2 (21 January 2002); and Guidance to the Executive Board of the Clean 
Development Mechanism, Decision 21/CP. 8, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Eighth Session, 
\'ew Delhi, 23 October-i November 2002: Addendum 3. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
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 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 12th edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980) at 
136-42. 
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criteria. Subsequently, the room for discretion, in which interest-based bargaining 
and political maneuver might ensue, will be limited so that rule-based arguments 
about the most appropriate option can dominate case-specific decisions. 
2.3 Technical and Scientific Expertise as a Means to 
Accelerate and Rationalize the Development of 
International Environmental Law 
As the development of international environmental law depends heavily on the 
proper scientific understanding of environmental problems, and the availability of 
technical solutions, all modern environmental treaty systems are designed to actively 
shape, in one form or another, widely accepted cognitive expectations on the scien-
tific or technological background of political action (see Chapter 9 'Science and 
Technology'). In most cases, the scientific and technological assessment apparatus 
of environmental treaty systems do not conduct primary research. Predominantly, 
they evaluate available information and produce a body of knowledge that is com-
monly agreed within the treaty system and, thus, is more accepted than information 
fed into the process by any actor because it has been scrutinized by multinational 
teams of experts. Perhaps the most impressive example is the European Monitoring 
and Evaluation Programme (EMEP) of the LRTAP Convention. It was originally 
established to assess the import-export budgets of certain air pollutants, beginning 
with sulphur dioxide, for all European member states but was later employed to 
allocate emission targets to the member countries.22 Similarly, under the Vienna 
Convention, existing information on the atmospheric chemistry of ozone depletion 
and the nature of ozone-depleting substances and their substitutes is regularly 
assessed. Likewise, the ground for the regulation of climate change was prepared by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which continues to serve as the 
informal scientific and technological branch of the climate change negotiations, 
despite the lack of a formal relationship to the UNFCCC. 
The organized assessment of the scientific and technological aspects of an envir-
onmental problem accelerates law-making because it allows the institutionalized 
policy-making process to start before the nature of an environmental problem, and 
the interests of possible contracting parties, have become clear. In general, political 
decision-makers will not agree on costly obligations to protect the environment, and 
abate pollution, until they have reliable information about the importance of a given 
Problem. Scientific and technological assessments can help provide the prerequisites 
tor the political acceptance of meaningful substantive obligations. Research activities 
R.R. Churchill, G. Kiittig, and L M. Warren,'The 1994 UNECE Sulphur Protocol' (1995), 7 1. Envt'l 
L
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on long-range transboundary air pollution started long before it had become clear 
from where the deposits of air pollutants in a given country originated, and to where 
the emissions were exported. Likewise, the regulation of ozone-depleting substances 
was preceded by the Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer, a scientific and 
technological structure within the framework of UNEP that assessed existing infor-
mation on the atmospheric chemistry of ozone depletion, and the nature of ozone-
depleting substances and their substitutes. 
The assessment of environmental problems and their solutions affects the 
nature of international environmental law-making because it assigns an import-
ant role within the law-making process to experts, including those from non-
governmental organizations and industry. 'Epistemic communities' that evolve 
around environmental treaty systems, frequently include both governmental and 
non-governmental experts (see Chapter 34 'Epistemic Communities'). Within the 
LRTAP Convention, EMEP was closely supervised by governmental experts, 
whereas the regional air pollution information and simulation model on which 
later regulatory approaches were based was elaborated by non-governmental 
scientists of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, 
Austria. During the contentious early negotiations on the Montreal Protocol, a 
technological assessment panel was established to bring together experts from dif-
ferent branches of industry, in particular, the users of ozone-depleting substances 
and the producers of substitutes, in order to generate common knowledge on the 
uses for which marketable substitutes existed. Likewise, experts from diverse 
nature protection NGOs are heavily involved in the assessment of endangered 
species within the framework of CITES. 
Successful scientific and technological assessment separates two distinct func-
tions from each other, namely the shaping of cognitive expectations on scientific 
and technological matters and the (subsequent) shaping of political consensus 
among the contracting parties. The assessment of scientific or technological know-
ledge is not designed to make, or replace, binding decisions, but to prepare them. If 
successful, such assessments produce common expectations about the relevance of 
the respective environmental problem and the availability of technical solutions. 
Whereas political decisions are founded upon interests in terms of costs and bene-
fits, scientific and technological assessments generate reliable knowledge that helps 
shape preferences. 
The informal power of scientific and technological assessment processes origin-
ates from the fact that convincing information is difficult for policymakers to 
ignore. Information that has been validated within the treaty system acquires the sta-
tus of accepted evidence about the significance of an environmental problem, the 
particular role of a given country or the availability of certain solutions to an envir-
onmental problem. Hence, even actors intending exclusively to maximize their own 
utility might be inclined to change their preferences if they learn about additional 
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implications of an environmental problem. Moreover, it becomes more difficult for 
a reluctant country to pursue the strategy of rejecting stringent pollution abatement 
measures, if a common assessment based upon an accepted methodology has proven 
the country to be an exporter of pollutants to neighbouring states. And a defensive 
strategy rejecting measures to protect the ozone layer cannot be justified by the lack 
of suitable substitutes for ozone-depleting substances, once the collective assessment 
process has revealed that such substitutes exist. In essence, the assessment of scientific 
and technological knowledge forces negotiators either to openly pursue parochial 
interests or to agree to the scientifically necessary and the technologically possible. 
To the extent that scientific and technological assessment gains influence, it helps 
'rationalize' the law-making process. Environmental law-making is not entirely 
determined by inter-governmental bargaining any more. Part of the process is with-
drawn from the immediate grip of parochial state interests and submitted to expert 
reasoning, which tends to be based on the exchange of convincing arguments rather 
than bargaining power. This does not mean that ensuing substantive obligations lack 
political consent by the contracting parties. Rather, states are dragged into a collective 
learning process from which it is difficult to escape, leading state preferences to be 
adjusted accordingly. 
3 R E S U L T I N G LEGAL STRUCTURE 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
TREATY SYSTEMS 
The dynamic regulatory approach of environmental treaty systems has immediate 
implications for the evolution of international environmental law. Its development is 
subject to two contradictory principles. On the one hand, international treaty law 
cannot bind states without their consent, if only because such rules would be difficult 
to enforce in the absence of a well-organized enforcement power. On the other hand, 
this principle of state consent does not preclude states from deliberately or implicitly 
assigning certain decision-making competencies to international institutions to 
expedite collective decision-making, and the entry into force of new obligations, in 
order to cope with newly arising environmental problems and to exploit new polit-
ical and technological opportunities for environmental protection. Accordingly, 
international environmental law evolves both in the traditional manner, through the 
adoption and revision of treaty law, and in other ways, through various forms of deci-
sions adopted within a treaty system. As a result, the whole package of obligations 
entered into by states is no longer entirely reflected in treaties. 
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3.1 Normative Development through Traditional 
Forms of International Law 
In spite of the required flexibility of environmental governance and the rapid evolu-
tion of substantive commitments, treaties still constitute the dominant form for the 
development of specific international environmental law. Soft law is relevant pri-
marily as an intermediate step on the way to binding forms of agreement or as an 
additional instrument within established treaty systems, but rarely as a substitute 
for them. States also prefer to codify even the auxiliary and procedural obligations 
of important framework conventions—for example, the LRTAP Convention, the 
Vienna Convention, and the UNFCCC—in the form of full-fledged international 
treaties, although these instruments lack important substantive obligations. To add 
substantive obligations, they resort increasingly to the adoption of protocols, which 
formally constitute treaties subsidiary to the respective conventions and are open for 
ratification or accession only to members of these conventions. 
Whereas the adaptation of the primary law of environmental treaty systems to 
new requirements occurs generally according to the established procedures for the 
amendment of international treaties, environmental treaty systems increasingly 
internalize the necessary institutional functions. Initially, the development of treaty 
law both in the form of amendments of existing treaties and the adoption of proto-
cols was assigned to diplomatic conferences convened outside the organizational 
apparatus of a treaty system. This is still formally true for the Barcelona Convention 
and the LRTAP Convention.23 Later treaty systems such as the Vienna Convention, 
Basel Convention, CBD, and UNFCCC assign the task of preparing and adopting 
amendments and protocols to their respective COPs.24 Upon entry into force of an 
amendment in 1987, the COP of the Ramsar Convention became formally involved 
in treaty amendments.25 Normally, an amendment or a new protocol must be 
decided upon by a certain majority of members of the treaty, frequently a two-thirds 
or a three-fourths majority, and they do not enter into force until ratified by a speci-
fied number of parties and only for those parties that have ratified. 
Regular amendments are rarely employed to develop key substantive obligations. 
More frequently, treaties are amended to modify governance arrangements, such as 
establishing the COP of the Ramsar Convention and introducing a procedure for the 
amendment of the instrument, allowing the European Community to become a 
party to CITES,26 and establishing the multilateral fund of the Montreal Protocol on 
23
 See LRTAP Convention, Article 12; and Barcelona Convention, Articles 15 and 16. 
24
 See Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Articles 8 and 9; Convention on the Control 
of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes (Basel Convention), Articles 15 and 17; Convention 
on Biological Diversity, Articles 2 8 ^ ; and UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Articles 15 
and 17. 
23
 M.J. Bowman/The Ramsar Convention Comes of Age' (1995) 42 Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 1 at 33"8-
26
 See 1982 Bonn Amendment to Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Flora and Fauna (CITES); 1983 Gaborone Amendment to CITES; 1982 Paris Protocol to Convention on 
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a permanent basis, which paved the way for the accession of a number of important 
developing countries.27 The most important exception to this rule is the Montreal 
Protocol, which has been amended repeatedly to broaden and tighten obligations to 
reduce and phase out the production and consumption of ozone-depleting sub-
stances. Likewise, the regulatory approach of the Basel Convention towards the 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes was transformed from a licensing 
system into a complete prohibition of exports from OECD countries to non-OECD 
countries by the amendment of 1995, after doubts as to whether a simple decision 
would suffice.28 
Due to domestic ratification requirements, the development of environmental 
treaty systems through regular amendments and the adoption of subsidiary proto-
cols is cumbersome and time-consuming. New obligations usually require several 
years to become effective. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force about seven years 
after its adoption in 1998, and the 1995 amendment of the Basel Convention still had 
not entered into force as of August 2006. To accelerate normative development, the 
members of the Montreal Protocol lowered the threshold for the entry into force of 
the London Amendments. Whereas the Vienna Convention would have required rati-
fication by two-thirds of the Montreal Protocol parties—that is, 38 ratifications—the 
London Amendment provided for its entry into force upon ratification by only 
20 states. 
Since each amendment binds only those states that accept it, amendments create a 
treaty regime with different memberships for the different instruments, making it 
increasingly difficult to identify reciprocal commitments. For example, the amend-
ments of the Montreal Protocol of 1990,1992,1997, and 1999 were, as of 22 November 
2004, in force for 175,164,121, and 84 of the 188 members of the protocol.29 In very rare 
cases, this problem may be solved by the winding up of an existing institution and the 
creation of a new one. For example, key members of the 1971 International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 
Oil Pollution Damage adopted a protocol in 1992 that created a new fund. They also 
withdrew their commitments from the original arrangement in order to force reluc-
tant members to join the 1992 fund with an adapted scheme of financial compensa-
tion for environmental damage from oil spills caused by tankers.30 Likewise, the 
Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention); 1987 
Regina Amendment to the Ramsar Convention. 
See R.E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998) at 183-8. 
1995 Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention, Decision Ulli, Decisions Adopted by the Third 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, Doc. UNEP/CHW.3/35 (28 November 
'995). 
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 Decision XVI/i, Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/17 (2004) at 42. 
30
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Uruguay Round negotiations that established the WTO replaced the 'a la carte' 
approach introduced by the Tokyo Round agreements into the 1947 General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, under which states could pick and choose which agreements to 
accept, with a single package of agreements that binds all WTO members.31 It is a pre-
requisite for this strategy that the newly created institution generates sufficient exclud-
able benefits that can be enjoyed only by its members. This condition is frequently not 
fulfilled in international environmental governance. In the case of regimes that protect 
a global or a regional commons, such as the ozone layer or a regional sea, replacing an 
existing treaty system with a new one might encourage reluctant states to refrain from 
joining the new institution rather than to accept its tightened obligations. 
3.2 Normative Development through Simplified 
Amendment Procedures 
Some treaty systems rely heavily on simplified procedures for the amendment of 
technical annexes because the regular procedure for the making and amendment of 
international treaty law has proven to be too slow to cope with the demand for rapid 
regulatory change.32 Under such procedures, amendments are elaborated by the 
COPs and must be adopted by specific majorities of parties. However, in contrast to 
regular amendments, these amendments to annexes enter into force automatically 
after a specified period of time—frequently 90 days—for all member states that do 
not object. Aside from this simple opting-out procedure, modified procedures have 
developed. Under the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, the amendment of an annex enters 
into force only if no member state objects. In other cases, amendments enter into 
force unless a certain number of member states object. For the 1979 Convention on 
the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, the quorum is one-
third of the parties; for the 1992 Convention on Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents, it is 16 states. Under the 1946 Whaling Convention, if one member state 
opts out, the period of time to opt out is automatically prolonged for the other 
members.33 These procedures are designed to ensure that a member state will not be 
committed to an amendment while other parties, possibly competitors, reject the 
new obligation. 
Although simplified amendment procedures have been designed for the adapta-
tion of technical details, this does not imply that these aspects are less important. 
, r " LH ;? a C k*?!\T , ' t ' W°rld Trad"'S SyStem: Law and Pollcy of International Economic Relations London (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999) at 46-9. 
F - w ^ T . ™ a n d R H ' S a n d ' ' M e t h o d s to Expedite Environmental Protection: International Ecostandards (1972) 66 A.J.I.L.37. 
"r ^ T C o n v « n t i o n o n t h e Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Article 
3~ convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Article V, Convention 
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Occasionally, allegedly technical annexes spell out core components of a treaty sys-
tem. Especially some conventions adopted in the early 1970s or before are composed 
of a very general main body and annexes that are subject to simplified amendment 
and that set forth detailed regulatory rules. For example, the Whaling Convention 
authorizes the International Whaling Commission to amend from time to time the 
annex comprising the measures for the protection of whales ('the schedule'). 
Likewise, the prohibition or restriction of international trade in endangered species 
of flora and fauna under CITES requires that species are classified as endangered or 
threatened. While classification decisions are subject to simplified amendment, they 
are occasionally highly contentious, especially if they address economically or 
socially important species such as certain whales or elephants and their products. 
Similarly, the Consultative Meeting of the London Convention could introduce, by 
modifying its annexes according to simplified amendment procedures, far-reaching 
and politically contentious new obligations to restrict and later prohibit the inciner-
ation of wastes at sea, and to phase out the dumping of industrial and radioactive 
wastes as an elaboration of the general obligation to prohibit the disposal of wastes at 
sea. Decisions of this kind are not merely of technical concern, but they are also 
highly political and touch upon major interests of member states. 
Particularly far-reaching is the adjustment procedure of the Montreal Protocol. 
Under this procedure, the MOP is empowered to 'adjust', in practice to tighten, 
reduction targets for ozone-depleting substances that are already regulated under 
the protocol (Article 2.9). Adjustments enter into force for all parties six months 
after the decision. Parties shall make efforts for adoption by consensus, but an 
adjustment may also be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the parties present and 
voting, which must include simple majorities of both developing and developed 
countries. Hence, decisions become automatically legally binding even for mem-
ber states that might have voted against the adjustment. Acceptance of this proced-
ure by the member states can be attributed to particular circumstances that limit 
the political risk inherent in the approach. At the time it was adopted, the ozone-
depleting substances in question were well known and it had been clear to nego-
tiators that they were going to be phased out in the foreseeable future.34 The 
conceptual importance of this procedure stems from the fact that it combines 
mandatory law-making by a MOP with majority voting. However, the procedure 
might have pushed the simplification of the amendment of international treaty law 
a step too far. Not only have all adjustment decisions so far been taken by consen-
sus, the procedure also has not been included in any other treaty system, as far as 
can be seen. 
on Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Article 26; and International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling, Article 5. 
Benedick, see note 27 above at 90. 
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The simplified amendment procedures of environmental treaty systems do not 
introduce a hierarchy of laws in which those parts subject to traditional amendment 
procedures, and thus under tighter control of the contracting parties, were superior 
to those parts subject to COP decision-making. Hierarchies of laws are well known 
from international organizations. Whereas the Charter of the United Nations assigns 
decision-making competencies to the Security Council, decisions of this body con-
stitute secondary law that does not modify the Charter itself. It is thus remarkable 
that the COPs of some environmental treaty systems are entitled to change inter-
national treaty law, especially the annexes to environmental treaties, and, in the 
exceptional case of the Montreal Protocol, even possibly against the expressed will 
of dissenting states. 
De facto, if not de jure, simplified amendment procedures delegate law-making 
functions to the COPs of environmental treaty systems, even if dissenting parties 
normally enjoy the right to opt out. Inaction under a simplified amendment proce-
dure with an opt-out clause may be interpreted as implicit consent with a decision.35 
Yet, this interpretation seems to be more directed at preserving the principle of 
sovereign consent enshrined in international law than at accounting for the particu-
lar nature of this form of law-making. In fact, simplified amendment procedures, 
whether or not they contain an opt-out clause, transfer the necessary activity of 
law-making from individual to collective action.36 Whereas international treaty law 
usually requires ratification by each individual state that agrees to be committed, 
under simplified amendment procedures new legal requirements emerge from the 
collective decision of the competent treaty body. According to both procedures, states 
cannot usually be bound against their will, but under simplified amendment proced-
ures, indifferent or inactive member states become committed by decisions without 
individual action. 
The importance of some annexes that are subject to simplified amendment proced-
ures and the fact that these procedures create international treaty law may have led 
to a move away from this approach as the principal means of developing environ-
mental treaty systems. In contrast to the conventions established in the early 1970s, 
such as CITES and the London Convention, later treaty systems restrict simplified 
amendment procedures to truly technical details lacking overwhelming general con-
cern—with the just-mentioned limited exception of the adjustment procedure of the 
Montreal Protocol. As discussed earlier in this chapter (section 2.1), the convention-
protocol approach replaced the convention-annex approach as the major flexibility 
mechanism for the making of treaty law, as exemplified in the Barcelona and LRTAP 
Convention systems. 
" J. Brunnee, 'COPing with Consent: Lavv-Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements' 
(2002) 15 Leiden J. Int'l L. 1 at 18-20. 
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3.3 Normative Development through Secondary 
Decision-Making 
To the extent that decisions of environmental treaty systems are not directed at modi-
fying existing, or at creating new, treaty law, they contribute to a rapidly growing 
body of system-specific secondary rules that are of tremendous importance in some 
areas of international environmental governance. In these cases, the flexibility of 
treaty systems is achieved through the formal or de facto delegation to the treaty's 
institutions of powers to adopt secondary decisions. Such competencies automat-
ically establish a two-tier hierarchy of obligations. Whereas the treaty at the constitu-
tional level remains under the tight control of the member states collectively and, 
with the exceptions discussed in section 3.2, also individually through national ratifi-
cation, a separate body of secondary rules emerges that depends on, and is thus sub-
sidiary to, the treaty. This body of secondary law is generated according to procedures 
that may, or may not, involve the COP (see Chapter 38 'Treaty Bodies'), but it derives 
its legitimacy and binding force from the superior treaty and from agreement among 
the member states. 
The formal legal status of secondary decisions is ambiguous and disputed. Under 
the law of international treaties, secondary law-making is not specifically addressed, 
except insofar as the contracting parties may agree on common interpretations of 
a treaty and on its provisional application prior to its formal entry into force.37 
Accordingly, authoritative interpretations by the COPs of environmental treaty 
systems designed to close unintended gaps of treaty law may be assumed to be 
legally binding at least for consenting states.38 Moreover, secondary decisions that are 
explicitly assigned to a decision-making body by the constituent treaties might 
also acquire full legal status, if treaty language suggests that legally binding force 
was intended by the contracting parties.39 For example, the MOP of the Montreal 
Protocol was explicitly empowered to consider the feasibility of, and adopt, trade 
measures concerning products containing, or produced with, ozone-depleting sub-
stances (Article 8) and to elaborate the non-compliance procedure. The Kyoto 
Protocol explicitly assigns a whole range of tasks to the COP/MOP of the treaty sys-
tem, which may have far-reaching implications and amount in fact to an exercise in 
'egislation, rather than to the mere interpretation of treaty law. Due to their hybrid 
structure, environmental treaty systems might also fall under the law of international 
organizations, under which competent bodies can adopt legally binding internal 
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 25. 
38
 See J. Sommer, 'Environmental Law-Making by International Organizations' (1996) 56 Zeitschrift 
fur ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 628 at 637-8. 
39
 See V. Roben, 'Institutional Developments under Modern International Environmental 
Agreements' (2000) 4 Max Planck Y.B. UN L. 363 at 404-5. 
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decisions by the required majorities of parties present and voting.40 Many important 
substantive decisions might be considered as internal to the legal order of the treaty 
system, even if they unfold certain external effects. 
Remarkably, the drafters of the treaties tend to avoid express statements on the 
legal status of decisions. Whereas many decisions may easily be conceived of as legally 
binding interpretations of treaty provisions, others develop treaty systems consider-
ably without being explicitly provided for in treaty law. The contracting parties seem 
to accept the ambiguous legal status of many secondary rules in exchange for the abil-
ity to employ secondary decision-making as a mechanism for the rapid development 
of environmental treaty systems. When an interim multilateral fund was established 
by the MOP of the Montreal Protocol by a simple 'decision', there was no discussion 
about the legal status of this instrument.41 Likewise, upon adoption of the non-
compliance procedure of the Montreal Protocol, the MOP expressly accepted the 
recommendation of the Legal Expert Group 'that there is no need to expedite the 
amendment procedure' under the Vienna Convention,42 suggesting that, even in 
the absence of amendment, non-compliance decisions would have sufficient legal 
authority. Without a specific competence, the COP of CITES has, over time, adopted 
various decisions that are apparently intended to, and seem to be regarded as, legally 
binding. Perhaps the most important of these decisions is the introduction of quota 
systems for various animal products such as ivory.43 In contrast, some parties argued 
that the decision of the COP of the Basel Convention to ban exports of hazardous 
wastes from OECD countries to non-OECD countries was not legally binding 
because the COP could not alter the parties' substantive obligations.44 Whereas the 
decision is therefore widely considered as reflecting political, rather than formal 
legal, commitment, the clear wording ('the Conference . . . decides to prohibit all 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes'), and the fact that it was adopted by 
consensus after contentious negotiations, suggest that the contracting parties never-
theless expected that it would be adhered to, and thus considered that the COP had 
the authority to commit the member states, even if not in legal terms. 
Within a particular treaty system, decisions will generally gain de facto binding 
force, if commitment is intended by the community of member states. The precise 
legal status of secondary rules is of comparatively little importance for the practical 
40
 R.R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, 'Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
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operation of environmental treaty systems. The contracting parties can, therefore, 
afford to avoid determining the issue of legal status. They tend to do so, because prin-
cipled discussion in this regard might jeopardize the successful reliance on decisions 
as a means of governance that is more flexible than regular treaty law, and at the same 
time able to commit the member states more intensely than mere recommendations. 
Therefore, they can employ the instrument of a firmly worded decision even in cases 
that reach far beyond their undisputed law-making authority. 
The commitment effect of decisions originates, first of all, from the consent of the 
contracting parties.45 A decision that attracts the broad support of all or at least most 
member states reflects a promise of the supporters to honour their mutual commit-
ment. Breaking such a promise undermines a state's reputation because offenders 
appear as unreliable cooperators. Therefore, the contracting parties in most environ-
mental treaty systems seek to adopt important, if not all, secondary decisions by con-
sensus so as to extend the consent-based binding force to all parties, even if adoption 
by simple or qualified majority is formally possible. 
Second, such decisions may be part of larger package deals among the contracting 
parties and cannot be ignored without jeopardizing the whole package. In many 
cases, international governance depends on package deals that combine different 
issues, each of which is advantageous for a different group of actors. In this case, all 
contracting parties will be aware of the fact that ex post withdrawal from undesired 
parts of the package may prompt the withdrawal of other parties from their obliga-
tions. Accordingly, member states with an interest in a given treaty system will accept 
and be prepared to implement ensuing obligations irrespective of their exact legal 
status. Hence, whether contributions to the multi-million dollar interim multilateral 
fund of the Montreal Protocol were considered as legally binding or not, contribut-
ing countries could not withdraw from their commitments without risking the non-
compliance of important developing countries.46 And the ban of the transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes from OECD countries to non-OECD countries was 
the precondition for the universal acceptance of the Basel treaty system. 
Third, secondary decisions may change the situation even for actors that dislike 
the content of the decisions, so that unilateral rejection is not a viable option.47 If 
provisions for the assessment of production and consumption figures under the 
Montreal Protocol, criteria for the classification of endangered species under CITES, 
or the rules of the clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol are 
formulated in a particular way that has been agreed upon within the relevant COP or 
MOP, the treaty systems will simply operate accordingly. Alternative options are 
excluded by the decision, so that, unless a member state is willing to leave the system, 
it is forced to accept the operation of the system as it is. 
45
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Fourth, environmental treaty systems replace the traditional procedures of litiga-
tion and dispute settlement under the rules of international law with internal mech-
anisms of norm interpretation and compliance control. The formal legal status of a 
decision accepted by the member states will not be relevant, unless a conflict over 
its content and consequences is arbitrated or litigated outside the treaty system. 
Whereas several environmental treaty systems explicitly envisage traditional inter-
national procedures for the settlement of conflicts, such as conciliation, third-party 
arbitration, or adjudication, these procedures have been used only in very few cases 
so far, and they are unlikely to be employed more widely in the future. Apart from 
being too confrontational, they do not account for the specificities of a particular 
treaty system. In particular, they risk involuntarily unravelling package agreements, 
if they dishonour informal parts of the treaty system. Instead, starting with the 
Montreal Protocol, several environmental treaty systems have developed their own 
mechanisms for implementation control and dispute settlement (see Chapter 43 
'Compliance Procedures'). These quasi-judicial mechanisms reflect the desire of 
contracting parties to internalize the function of dealing with disputes about com-
pliance into the overall collective decision-process of the respective treaty systems. 
Finally, environmental treaty systems may develop their own internal sanctioning 
instruments to thwart their gradual unraveling through the 'selective exit' of con-
tracting parties from undesired obligations. Particularly relevant are privileges 
granted only under the condition that obligations are fulfilled. The 'indicative list of 
measures' available in case of non-compliance adopted under the Montreal Protocol 
includes, besides assistance and the issuing of cautions, the possible 'suspension . . . 
of specific rights and privileges under the Protocol.. . including those concerned 
with industrial rationalization, production, consumption, trade, transfer of technol-
ogy, financial mechanism and institutional arrangements.'48 These measures are 
directed at withdrawing privileges enjoyed by the member states under the protocol, 
and the MOP has cautioned a number of countries in transition that it might invoke 
them.49 Privileges granted under the Kyoto Protocol include, beside financial and 
technological assistance, the employment of the flexibility mechanisms, namely the 
clean development mechanism, joint implementation, and emissions trading, to 
reduce implementation costs. Their use currently requires that countries meet eligi-
bility criteria, and the suspension of eligibility in cases of non-compliance might 
become a major sanctioning instrument of the treaty system. 
The increasingly wide use of decisions by a treaty's institutions as a governance 
instrument that can generate commitment among the member states contributes 
significantly to the flexibility of modern environmental treaty systems. Whereas 
48
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the making of environmental treaty law has become less flexible over time especially 
due to the replacement of the convention-annex approach by the more traditional 
convention-protocol approach, environmental treaty systems do not seem to be less 
flexible than before. The more traditional form of treaty-law making is comple-
mented by the increasing use of highly flexible secondary decisions. In spite of their 
often unclear, and occasionally disputed, formal legal status, such decisions reflect an 
important part of the entire package of obligations faced by the member states of 
many environmental treaty systems. As long as the commitments reflected in these 
decisions are, within their respective treaty systems, not treated significantly different 
from commitments enshrined in formal treaty law, they will be honoured by the 
member states equally well. 
4 C O N C L U S I O N 
The making and evolution of international environmental law are related to the 
establishment of numerous separately institutionalized multilateral treaty systems. 
Treaty systems are negotiated and adopted predominantly within the framework of 
existing international organizations or similar institutions. Upon their establish-
ment, they become machineries for the making of new law and for the development 
of existing law in their respective areas of competence. One characteristic of the 
making and development of international environmental law is the fragmentation 
of the institutional setting from which it emerges. Environmental treaty systems 
govern comparatively small areas of international relations. Apparently, the con-
tracting parties prefer the establishment of new treaty systems to the linkage of new 
environmental problems to existing systems. As a second characteristic, envir-
onmental treaty systems comprise, like international organizations, a permanent 
institutional component that enables the contracting parties to adjust obligations 
as necessary or appropriate to new circumstances as well as to supervise implemen-
tation and react collectively to cases of non-compliance. 
In contrast to other areas of international governance, international environ-
mental governance decidedly relies upon a step-by-step approach, and almost all 
important treaty systems have considerably developed over time. Through their 
scientific and technological apparatus for the assessment of governance-related 
facts, treaty systems comprise arrangements directed at creating new opportunities 
for cooperation among the contracting parties. Moreover, they have developed 
different institutional devices for the accelerated entry into force of new obligations. 
These arrangements include simplified amendment procedures, the adoption of 
secondary decisions that elaborate treaty law, the resort to soft law instruments if 
legally binding obligations cannot be agreed upon, and interim mechanisms to 
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bridge the occasionally long period until a new treaty or amendment enters into 
force. 
Environmental treaty systems partially transform intergovernmental bargaining 
into deliberative transnational problem-solving processes. Essentially, policy-making 
within environmental treaty systems remains based upon inter-governmental nego-
tiations, and states must be assumed to pursue predominantly their parochial inter-
ests. However, assessments of scientific and technological knowledge introduce, if 
successfully operating, a sphere of technical deliberation into the bargaining process. 
Improved and collectively validated knowledge about the scope and implications of 
an environmental problem or about the availability of technological solutions con-
tributes to the gradual modification of state preferences, which in turn can lead to 
agreement on new commitments. Moreover, the most advanced environmental 
treaty systems increasingly rely on the delegation of implementation decisions to 
specifically structured procedures that are directed at the application of general nor-
mative criteria, and avoid the mere balancing of state interests. If operating success-
fully, such procedures can create a process of normative deliberation. 
As a result of these far-reaching internal law-making activities, the whole package 
of obligations entered into by the contracting parties to an environmental treaty 
system is no longer entirely reflected in the text of the treaty. Although the major 
substantive and procedural obligations remain enshrined in international treaty law, 
additional rules and implementation decisions add up to system-specific bodies of 
secondary law. Irrespective of the formal legal status of these rules, environmental 
treaty systems operate on the assumption that decisions that are meant to be manda-
tory are accepted as commitments by the parties. Moreover, the contracting parties 
frequently refrain from clarifying the legal status of the decisions, because this 
endeavour might jeopardize the use of secondary decision-making altogether. As 
long as they abstain from external litigation and arbitration, they remain the masters 
of the process, defining collectively what they are prepared to accept and which 
obligations they expect others to observe. As a consequence, environmental treaty 
systems become autonomous sectoral systems of international law, which increas-
ingly internalize the management of conflicts about the interpretation of commit-
ments as well as the treatment of cases of non-compliance. 
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